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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Do Expert Systems Impact Taxpayer Behavior?  (December 2003) 
Steven J. Olshewsky, B.S., University of Kentucky; 
M.B.A., University of Kentucky; 
J.D., University of Kentucky 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:   Dr. L. Murphy Smith 
 Dr. Stanley H. Kratchmann 
 
Individuals are increasingly using expert system tax programs as a substitute for 
paid professionals when preparing their income tax returns.  This study examines ways 
that expert systems encourage the same aggressive results documented when paid 
professionals are used.  Examining the use of expert systems and the related behavior of 
taxpayers reveals aggressive reporting related to the commonly used warning alerts in 
tax programs.  Using an experimental economics setting in which participants report 
liabilities with the possibility of penalties for noncompliant reporting, participants filled 
out a Claim Form mimicking a Schedule C in one of four conditions: manual 
preparation, no alerts, alerts triggered at a high threshold of reporting aggression, and 
alerts triggered at a low level of reporting aggression.  Comparing the amounts deducted 
in each condition revealed that warning alerts with low thresholds of activation 
decreased aggressive reporting while warning alerts with high thresholds of activation 
increased aggressive reporting.  Survey instruments measuring user satisfaction 
indicated significantly lower satisfaction when (high or low level) warning alerts were 
 iv
used versus no warning alerts.  Contrary to expectations, respondents using the expert 
system tax program with high threshold warning alerts compared to no warning alerts 
reported a significantly higher perception of accuracy.  This study demonstrates the 
extreme to which taxpayers are swayed by perceived aspects of the tax software that are 
irrelevant to the facts of their tax situations.  Exactly what taxpayers need to be given by 
way of guidance and direction to comport their behavior to the tax laws is a critical 
question of public policy.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tax return preparation programs are readily available in the commercial market 
and are widely used by the public.  Past studies have shown that when taxpayers use 
professional tax return preparers, the tax returns are less compliant, i.e., more aggressive 
(see Schmidt, 2001 for a summary).  The substitution of computerized individual income 
tax preparation systems (tax programs) for paid professionals raises questions about 
whether tax programs encourage the same aggressiveness as paid professionals.  This 
study addresses whether tax programs and their warning alerts influence taxpayer 
reporting and satisfaction and whether tax programs can be a preferable substitute to 
paid professionals. 
The literature suggests that taxpayers have traditionally sought help from 
professional tax preparers primarily to help limit their aggression and give them 
confidence in the accuracy of their tax returns (Tan, 1999).  Sellers of tax programs, 
such as TurboTax, recognize that taxpayers seek the same help from tax programs as 
from professional tax preparers and this is evidenced by promotional press releases 
claiming tax software makes tax preparation more accurate, that users find returns easier 
to do and that users are more satisfied with their tax returns (Intuit.com, 2002).  This 
claim of expertise by vendors is strengthened by tax programs offering technical 
information about the tax laws and audit diagnostics in the form of warning alerts that 
pop up to offer instruction or guidance about specific tax return lines.  Intuit, Inc. 
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reinforced this impression of guaranteeing accuracy with an optional $25 warranty 
coverage against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenge.  
If tax programs are sought, and in fact serve, as a surrogate for professionals, 
then the problems documented when using professionals could be discoverable when 
using tax programs.  Taxpayers may tend to over rely on tax programs, becoming more 
aggressive as they do using paid professionals, because of the potential for technology 
dominance (Arnold & Sutton, 1998).  Another reason tax programs might increase 
aggression is the unlimited opportunity to seek increased economic benefit by 
manipulating the results with relatively costless data input iterations.   
Because tax programs support the decision making process (Davis & Brozovsky, 
1995), they are expert systems whose effect on judgment and decision-making is 
discoverable.  Expert systems have been extensively studied in many areas of 
accounting, especially auditing, and decisions aids have been used to investigate the 
behavior of professional tax researchers (Cloyd, 1997; Smith & McDuffie, 1996; Brown 
& Wensley, 1995).  This study looks at the use of expert systems by the taxpayers 
themselves and the related behavior of those taxpayers.   
This study seeks to discover the effect of tax programs upon tax reporting and to 
discover the related effects of commonly used warning alerts employed by these 
programs using an experimental economics setting in which participants report 
deductions/credits with the possibility of penalties for overly aggressive reporting.  
Participants in the experiment filled out a Claim Form mimicking a Schedule C in one of 
four conditions: manual, no alerts, alerts triggered at a high threshold of reporting 
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aggression, and alerts triggered at a low level of reporting aggression.  Data comparisons 
between these conditions examined the relative effect of using a tax program and the 
exacerbating or palliating effect of warning alerts with high or low thresholds of 
activation.  Follow-up survey instruments determined the satisfaction levels reported in 
each context and provided risk preferences and demographic factors of each participant 
to rule out these possibly confounding factors. 
Participants using tax programs were expected to report more aggressively than 
those using manual systems.  Warning alerts triggered by the lowest level of aggressive 
reporting were expected to palliate the tax program effect, causing participants to report 
more conservatively.  Warning alerts triggered only at the highest level of noncompliant 
reporting are expected to exacerbate the over reliance of participants on the tax 
programs, thereby causing more aggressive reporting.   
The results provide evidence of ways that tax programs with different types of 
warning alerts might contribute to noncompliance through encouraging more aggressive 
reporting.  How these warning alerts can be modified to improve reporting accuracy is 
useful information from a public policy standpoint as well as the practical aspect of 
improving customer satisfaction with tax programs.  This study serves the interests of 
consumers, sellers and regulatory agencies by expanding the research about how features 
of an expert system affect taxpayer behavior.      
The market for tax programs is large and fast growing with the readily available 
technology and ease of use inviting the average taxpayer to employ a computer system 
instead of a paid professional (Hicks & Rubenstein, 1996).  Intuit, Inc. alone claimed 
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over 14 million taxpayers used its product in 2001  (Intuit.com, 2002).  Tax software is 
being manufactured by at least 35 different software companies attempting to meet the 
public demand for tax programs, suggesting that this market trend is expected to 
continue (Zarowin, 1999).   
This level of consumer interest suggests a need for investigation of the role that 
tax programs might play in aggressive reporting.  Discovering the effect that tax 
programs might have on aggressive reporting, and taxpayer compliance in extreme 
cases, is important to tax program manufacturers who currently claim that their products 
increase accuracy.  Because these claims of increased accuracy could be misleading or 
untrue, it is in the public interest for users to know of any potential for increased 
penalties resulting from the possible effects of using tax programs.  The IRS could 
identify returns done with tax programs and adjust their audit protocols to match any 
increased risk levels of lower compliance when using a tax program.  Additionally, this 
research extends the expert decision aid literature to the tax setting and broadens the 
behavioral research on the subject of taxpayers using a form of paid preparation. 
 The following section presents the hypotheses and their motivation based on a 
review of related literature.  A methodology section describes the participants, 
instruments and procedures of the experiment.  Results are analyzed in section four.  
Conclusions and limitations are discussed in the fifth section.   
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II. MOTIVATION & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
Voluntary tax compliance is reported by the IRS to be around 82%, leaving 
almost one in five tax returns filed with some degree of noncompliance (Christen and 
Hite, 1997).  The amount of underreported federal income taxes –the tax gap related to 
noncompliance— was estimated to be growing at over ten percent per year between 
1973 and 1987 to over $100 billion (IRS, 1990).  Without including the underreporting 
of organizations or illegal income, the 1986 taxes unpaid because of individuals’ 
inaccurate reporting practices approximated 20 percent of all federal income and 40 
percent of the federal deficit for the same year (Roth, 1989).  Noncompliance is a 
significant fact of tax accounting and has an economic impact justifying the 
investigation of factors contributing to taxpayer reporting failures such as the 
aggressiveness that an expert system might encourage. 
The question of noncompliance comes up naturally as the result of aggressive 
reporting by taxpayers as extreme cases of aggression can cause deviation from the tax 
laws, and so aggression is considered the primary factor contributing to noncompliance 
throughout this paper.  Aggression can be influenced by several factors that are 
independent of a taxpayer’s deliberate intention to misreport their tax position, with 
behavioral models typically failing to account for unintentional reporting deviations 
(Erard, 1997).  Past studies have shown taxpayers are more interested in conservative 
reporting and seek safety from the possibility of government audit much more than the 
commonly assumed desire to simply minimize tax liability (Hite and McGill, 1992).  
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Showing whether and how tax programs contribute to aggressive tax reporting, and the 
role of expert system features such as warning alerts in exacerbating or palliating the 
aggression of taxpayer reporting, is important to taxpayers whose interests might 
otherwise not be served.   
Taxpayers have been shown to over-rely on professional tax preparers, accepting 
suggested reporting guidelines as correct (Kaplan et al., 1988).  Using an expert system 
instead of a human expert raises the question of whether taxpayers can still be expected 
to defer to expertise greater than their own especially when employing computerized 
help in a technical area like tax.  The theory of technology dominance predicts that when 
a taxpayer generally lacking expertise in tax uses an intelligent decision aid such as a tax 
program, the tax program will take primary control of the decision-making process 
(Arnold & Sutton, 1998).  Discovering the degree to which marketing claims of 
improved accuracy may be safely relied upon is important to taxpayers who need to rely 
on tax programs for unbiased reporting assistance.   
Past research into taxpayer aggression has focused either on economic factors 
directly influencing the payoff and penalty structure of the tax system or on the 
interactive role of the taxpayer and the professional tax preparer (Smith and Kinsey, 
1986).  Professional tax preparers (CPAs and attorneys) assisted in the filing of about 
44% of all tax returns in 1979, and these returns accounted for 74% of the 
noncompliance that year (Klepper and Nagin, 1989a).  Other studies have consistently 
verified that a higher magnitude of noncompliance exists when returns are professionally 
prepared versus when they are self-prepared without aid (Erard, 1993).   
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Taxpayers have been shown to be much more acceptant of aggressive advice 
when they receive it from a CPA helping them prepare their taxes (Schmidt, 2001).  
Taxpayers move much further from their naturally conservative reporting tendencies 
when using a professional preparer to navigate gray areas of the tax law (Christen & 
Hite, 1997).  This tendency of taxpayers to become aggressive in the presence of expert 
advice from a professional is so extreme that tax preparers report an awareness of the 
phenomenon with their clients notwithstanding clients’ reports that their true preferences 
are for conservative reporting (Duncan et al., 1989; Milliron, 1988; IRS, 1987).  This 
observed disconnect between taxpayer attitudes and behavior is well documented when 
the expert is a professional, but has not been explored in the environment of an expert 
system. 
Tax Programs vs. Manual Preparation 
Tax is the fastest changing area of the law and taxpayers are generally unable to 
keep up with the latest tax laws.  Following the most radical tax overhaul since 1958, the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the primary transmission mechanism used by taxpayers to 
become aware of the new tax deductibility rules in 1987 was found to be the use of a tax 
professional (Hrung, 2001).  Whereas individual taxpayers have traditionally relied on 
tax preparation professionals (i.e., CPAs and attorneys) for guidance in complying with 
tax laws, a large and growing number of taxpayers are turning to tax preparation 
software for this guidance (Hicks & Rubenstein, 1996).  This study tests the assumption 
that tax programs, in substituting for paid professionals as experts, facilitate the same 
aggressive reporting behavior as do paid preparers.  
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Decision aids often change the communication of information that conveys risk 
cues and thereby change judgments about risk (Dilla & Stone, 1997).  Psychological 
theory suggests that relatively uninformed taxpayers using information systems will 
become overconfident and thus act aggressively as a result of the decision aid’s 
influence (Griffin & Tversky, 1992).  In response to the AICPA’s invited comment 
about possible disservice to individual investors, an economic experiment found that less 
informed investors using information systems suffered a confidence bias and became 
overly aggressive thereby losing money in a trading game setting (Bloomfield et al., 
1999).    
The typical decision making strategy of considering a similar past situation, 
comparing it to the one at hand and then making small adjustments in fitting the previous 
decision to the current situation leads to poor performance where personal experience is 
lacking and this encourages heavier reliance on decision support systems (Hoch & 
Schkade, 1996).  Any computer system can be found to cause increased confidence if 
used as an expert system through a phenomenon called technology dominance (Arnold 
& Sutton, 1998).  Where a taxpayer uses a tax program as a substitute for a paid 
professional, they are accepting the tax program as an aid and tool, but also as a source 
of expertise upon which they can become over-reliant.  This would result in an increased 
confidence and surrender to technology dominance allowing the taxpayer to become 
more aggressive, and thereby possibly move into lower levels of compliance without 
realizing it.  The following hypothesis (stated in the alternative) tests this proposition:     
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H1:  Participants using tax programs without warning alerts will have higher deduction 
claims than participants using manual systems (i.e., there is a tendency by 
taxpayers toward aggressive reporting through over-reliance on a 
computerized system presumed to have expertise). 
 
Warning Alerts  
A long series of studies has investigated the environment of taxpayers interacting 
with tax practitioners and how noncompliance by aggressive reporting is increased or 
decreased in different ways within that environment (LaRue and Reckers, 1989).  On the 
one hand, professionals play the role of enforcing the tax laws by explaining the tax code 
in a way that advises clients of strict limits that must be complied with (Pei et al., 1992).  
On the other hand, professionals interpret the grey areas of the tax code so that clients 
are allowed to report more aggressively while still believing they are complying with the 
law (Kaplan et al., 1988).     
This dual role of the professional is explained by the duality of contexts in which 
tax issues can be presented.  Well-settled issues evoke professional advice that avoids 
any attempt to contravene the clear-cut letter of the law, while dealing with gray area 
issues can evoke milder cautions against penalty and allow more aggressive tax positions 
to develop (Klepper et al., 1989).  Even though paid preparers assist in the enforcement 
of unambiguous tax laws, professional advice in areas of ambiguous tax law has been 
shown to increase taxpayer noncompliance (Tan, 1999).  As such, not only do tax 
preparation aids warrant investigation, but the degree to which those aids present the 
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ambiguity of the tax rules to the taxpayer is an important issue in understanding how 
computer programs can tend to influence compliance. 
Warning Alerts Triggered at Low Thresholds 
Compliance is a goal whose achievement is usually sought through various 
measures creating fear in the mind of the taxpayer such as the threat that aggressive 
reporting will cause an increased probability of being audited (Forrest & Sheffrin, 2002).  
The role of the so-called independent preparer as policing the taxpayer is tacitly assumed 
(Developments in the Law, 1994; Reinganum & Wilde, 1991).  In Italy, as an example 
of the enforcement role sought of professionals, CPAs have been given formally 
recognized gatekeeper duties and set a “conformity seal” upon tax returns (Franzoni, 
1998).        
Clients predominantly want professional tax preparers to assume a law 
enforcement role (Hite and McGill, 1992).  The preference for professionals to err on the 
most conservative side of paying all possibly required taxes is shared by 70% of 
taxpayers in contrast to only 25% of taxpayers who seek professional help for the 
purposes of reducing their tax liability (Collins et al., 1990).  Taxpayers seeking the aid 
of tax programs are assumed to share the motives of those seeking the aid of a paid 
professional.  All taxpayers are thus considered to be primarily interested in guidance 
and direction toward the ends of strict compliance and to be predisposed towards 
avoiding aggressive reporting.  
 If a tax program gives clear compliance guidelines that are triggered at a low 
threshold of deviation from the most conservative reporting position, taxpayers will be 
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encouraged to report in strict compliance even though a tax matter may qualify as a gray 
area issue.  Taxpayers, already motivated by strict compliance, are thus empowered to 
avoid aggressive reporting.  This concept is expressed in the second testable hypothesis 
(stated in the alternative):   
 
H2:  Participants using tax programs with low threshold alerts will have lower deduction 
claims than participants using tax programs with no alerts (i.e., there is a 
tendency by taxpayers to conform to warning alerts triggered by anything 
less than the most conservative reporting). 
 
Warning Alerts Triggered at High Thresholds 
 A study of Australian government tax agents revealed that their most perceived 
ethical criticism of tax practitioners is their failure to inquire fully in cases where client 
information or documentation is inaccurate or incomplete (Marshall et al., 1998).  
Generally accepted in the accounting literature is that tax professionals reduce 
uncertainty in the minds of taxpayers about how transactions should be reflected in a tax 
return, yet prior psychological research suggests that a confirmation bias may prevent 
taxpayers from questioning the information they report in the presence of expert 
guidance (Cloyd & Spilker, 1999).  Analytical models describe a principle-agent 
relationship in which the taxpayer relies on the tax expert to resolve tax law uncertainty 
and that noncompliance is a function of how fully ambiguities are eliminated (Phillips & 
Sansing, 1998).  Where taxpayers expect some guidance or even policing to avoid 
noncompliance but receive less than the direction sought in that regard, they may tend 
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aggressively toward noncompliance thinking they are in the safety of a more 
conservative reporting or within the bounds of a gray area. 
 Taxpayers using a tax program that provides warning alerts, but only triggered at 
the highest level of aggressive reporting, could report aggressively while thinking they 
are being more conservative than they actually are.  Over-reliance on the warning alert 
feature as a gatekeeper will skew taxpayers’ appreciation of the true boundaries. When a 
taxpayer is aware of the presence of warning alerts and expects that the tax program will 
prevent aggressive reporting, then any reporting up to the level of triggering of the 
warning alert might be assumed to be at a conservative level even though it may actually 
be an aggressive reporting.  This is expressed in the third testable hypothesis (stated in 
the alternative): 
   
H3:  Participants using tax programs with high threshold alerts will have higher 
deduction claims than participants using tax programs without alerts (i.e., 
there is a tendency by taxpayers to report aggressively with warning alerts 
triggered only at the highest levels of aggressive reporting). 
 
Taxpayer Satisfaction 
 Because dissatisfaction can lower user acceptance, user satisfaction can play a 
key role in the success of any computerized system (Monnickendam, 2003).  User 
satisfaction is the most commonly used variable of interest when researching the success 
of an information system (DeLone & McLean, 2003).  Manufacturer claims of increased 
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taxpayer satisfaction suggest testing for user satisfaction in addition to system influences 
on reporting. 
Conservative tax reporting becomes an even higher priority when taxpayers feel 
their tax knowledge is increased (Eriksen & Fallen, 1996).  A person’s assessment of 
their knowledge about any subject is affected by their confidence in that knowledge 
(Renner & Renner, 2001).  Confidence in the accuracy of a system is a component factor 
of user satisfaction as measured by the end-user computing satisfaction (EUCS) 
instrument (Doll & Torsadeh, 1988).   
Self-assessed confidence in accuracy was overestimated, although not correlated 
with accuracy in a study of financial decision making with a computerized support 
system (Lawrence & Sim, 1999).  The prevalent marketing claims of increased customer 
satisfaction with tax programs calls into question the source of that satisfaction relative 
to possibly inflated self-assessments of conservative reporting.  EUCS tests the success 
of a computer system based on two components of user satisfaction: ease of use and 
information content (McHaney et al., 1999).   
Increased satisfaction can be expected with tax programs due to the increased 
ease of use and the perceived increase of information provided by an expert system.  
However, as warning alerts make tax programs more complex, the systems may seem 
less “friendly” and thus more cumbersome while bolstering confidence through an 
increased perception of expertise.  These relative perceptions of satisfaction will be 
tested with the following hypotheses (stated in the alternative): 
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H4a:  Participants using tax programs with warning alerts will report higher “information 
content” satisfaction than participants using tax programs without alerts 
(i.e., there is a higher assumption of expertise by taxpayers with warning 
alerts used in tax programs). 
 
H4b:  Participants using tax programs with warning alerts will report lower “ease of use” 
satisfaction than participants using tax programs without alerts (i.e., 
taxpayers will regard warning alerts as a complicating feature). 
 
Recapitulation 
 These four hypotheses test the tax program manufacturers claims of increased 
accuracy and satisfaction.  Accuracy is the primary measure of success as taxpayers have 
been found to be more interested in conservative reporting and safety from the 
possibility of government audit than the commonly assumed desire to simply minimize 
tax liability (Hite and McGill, 1992).  User satisfaction is the most common measure of 
success with computerized systems generally (Delone & McLean, 1992).   
User satisfaction is tested because the relationship between user satisfaction and 
performance has been found significant (Gelderman, 1998).  Tax programs are expert 
systems that support the decision making process by bringing additional knowledge to 
taxpayer environments (Davis & Brozovsky, 1995).  As such, taxpayers are assumed to 
seek out the aid of a tax program for many of the same reasons that they would a tax 
professional.  Because tax professionals have been shown to introduce biases affecting 
aggressive reporting levels, the similar effects of tax programs are tested for in this 
study.   
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
Participants were introduced to a hypothetical circumstance in which they are 
assumed to have earned some money in a home based business for which they are given 
receipts and other documentation.  They are thus endowed with some earnings, but are 
also charged with related expenses against which they needed to apply credits (as though 
deductions) to make a claim for payment (as though a refund) of withheld earnings.  In 
this way, an experimental economics setting was created which mimics the income tax 
return preparation scenario. 
Participants were provided with background information (Appendix A), June 
financial records and line-by-line instructions (Appendix B) along with a completed 
example Claim Form for the month of June (Appendix C) showing the comparison 
between a “minimum” and “maximum” reporting strategy.  June’s information was used 
as a tutorial to teach participants how the to complete the Claim Form.  The process was 
described using an experimenter script (Appendix G) and discussed until everyone in the 
experimental group understood the basic task. 
A set of July financial information (Appendix D) was used to manually complete 
a blank Claim Form as a practice set.  The results of the practice set were reviewed with 
participants.  When everyone in the experimental group understood how to complete the 
task manually, an August Claim Form (Appendix E) and set of August information 
(Appendix F) was provided as the experimental task for participants to complete.       
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Participants in the experiment were randomly assigned to perform substantially 
the same task in one of four settings: manual preparation (no computer), computer 
program assisted with no warning alerts, computer assisted with warning alerts triggered 
by the slightest deviance from the most conservative possible input (low threshold), and 
computer assisted with warning alerts triggered only by extreme deviance from the most 
conservative possible input (high threshold).  In these settings, the participants made 
claims for payment based on the provided information that required them to make 
judgment decisions in contexts of varying ambiguity levels.  As with tax return 
preparation, higher claims of credits (deductions) were rewarded with higher payment 
(lower tax liability), but caused higher risk of scrutiny (audit).     
Participants 
Because the experiment is purposefully neutral to individual tax experiences, 
most adult, previous wage earners qualify for participation.  Participants are expected to 
have only a general understanding of payments and withholdings to which any 
employment involving a paycheck would expose them.  Individual taxpayers generally 
do one tax return per year, at which time they either purchase a tax program they have 
never used before or need to get reacquainted with the current year’s version of a tax 
program with which they have had relatively minimal experience.  In this aspect of tax 
program use, business students are a representative sample of the population of 
taxpayers in general and are used as participants in this study.  
In response to the common objection against using students in experimental 
studies, extensive research has been done to show that students’ responses in studies are 
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not significantly different than those from other sample pools (Plott, 1987).  In this case, 
where the effect of a computerized system is the subject of investigation, students with 
their assumed adaptations to computer systems in general are perhaps the natural 
participant to glean information relevant to the target market of the tax programs under 
consideration.  Participants were asked about their experience with tax programs, 
computers and so forth in an exit questionnaire, but their experience was roughly similar 
with differences randomly distributed. 
Four treatment groups had a minimum of 21 participants in each with a total of 
105 participants in the total experiment.  These 105 were drawn from the student 
population of a Southwest US college.  There is no reason to think that undergraduate 
accounting students are any more or less representative of the taxpaying population or 
that they would be better able to complete the experimental task. 
Treatment Manipulations 
 Manual System 
As a baseline for comparing the effect of using a computerized system, 38 
participants completed the task manually using only paper and pencil.  For this task 
setting, an August Claim Form was exactly as the July Claim form.  Participants entered 
the information by writing directly on the form and manually calculated the pay-off 
amount they were claiming. 
Computerized System, No Alerts 
 To provide a comparison against manual systems and as a baseline for comparing 
the effects of computerized systems with warning alerts, 22 participants completed the 
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task using a computerized system with no alerts.  For this task setting, the August Claim 
Form appeared on a computer screen exactly as it appeared on paper for the manual 
version.  Participants entered the information on each line by using the mouse and 
keyboard of the computer.  The computer provided the calculations of processing the 
numbers from the supporting worksheets and totaling all numbers entered on the Claim 
Form.  The total amount claimed appeared on line 13 of the Claim Form as a running 
total that changed with each entry until the participants indicated that they were done.   
Computerized System, Low Alerts 
To provide a comparison against computerized systems without alerts, 21 
participants completed the task using a computerized system with alerts that were 
triggered at the lowest possible deviance from the most conservative (minimum) 
reporting of claim numbers.  For this task setting, the August Claim Form appeared on a 
computer screen and participants completed the Claim Form exactly as described above.  
In addition to the computer providing the calculations and transferring of numbers 
entered on the worksheets and Claim Form, the computer also evaluated the numbers for 
conformity to the conservative standards of the minimum amounts that should be 
claimed.   
The slightest deviance from the preset minimum number to report (as described 
to participants with the June Claim Form during training) caused a separate window to 
pop up on the screen displaying a warning alert.  The participant was reminded by the 
warning alert message of the instructions governing the item for which the number was 
entered as described in the Line-by-Line Instructions used by all participants.  The 
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warning alert required participants to enter their choices about how to respond to the 
warning by clicking on a linked button before continuing with filling out the Claim 
Form.      
Computerized System, High Alerts 
To provide another comparison against computerized systems without alerts, 24 
participants completed the task using a computerized system with alerts that were 
triggered only by high deviance from the most conservative (minimum) reporting of 
claim numbers.  For this task setting, the August Claim Form appeared on a computer 
screen and participants completed the Claim Form exactly as described above for the 
other two computerized systems.  The computer provided the calculations and transfer of 
numbers entered on the worksheets and Claim Form, and also evaluated the numbers by 
comparing them to the conservative standards of the minimum amounts that could be 
claimed.  In this task setting, a broad degree of tolerance was allowed for deviance 
before warning alerts were triggered.   
The deviance from the preset minimum number to report (as described to 
participants with the June Claim Form during training) had to be half the range to the 
maximum number that could be reasonably reported (also described during the training) 
in order to cause a separate window to pop up on the screen displaying a warning alert.  
If the participant triggered a warning alert by their high deviance, the instructions in the 
message given by the warning alert was the same as in the Low Alert task setting.  If the 
threshold for triggering the warning alert was exceeded, the warning alert required 
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participants to respond by clicking the warning alert off, thus encouraging participants to 
enter a lower number.  
Covariates 
Taxpayers fail to properly report what they owe in taxes for reasons that go 
beyond the traditional expected utility theories of risk and penalty (Cowell, 1990).  Tax 
research, both empirical and analytical, views choices about tax return filings as 
considering risk (Allingharn and Sandmo, 1972; Reinganum and Wilde 1985, 1988; 
Beck et al.  1991; Madeo et al., 1987; Jackson and Jones, 1985; Jackson and Milliron, 
1986).  This study isolates system effects on aggressive reporting by providing empirical 
evidence to directly support (or refute) claims of facilitation and customer satisfaction 
with the system using a computer anxiety instrument (Loyd & Loyd, 1985) and a risk 
instrument (Klein, 1999) to control for possible differences in computer anxiety and 
general risk preference among participants. 
Individual characteristic differences have been shown to affect whether a person 
notices, encodes, comprehends, or complies with visual warnings (Szewczyk, 2003).  In 
a general experiment of noncompliance comparing computer-assisted reporting to other 
reporting media in the context of welfare fraud, significantly correlated independent 
variables contributing to the admission of cheating included gender and age (Van der 
Heijden et al., 2000).  Demographic factors previously found to relate to cognitive 
function, gender, age, background, and personal histories were included in an exit 
questionnaire (Appendix H).    
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In examining panel data, factors such as level of income and marginal tax rate 
have not been found to have any affect on tax preparer usage and so are not considered 
in this study (Christian et al., 1993).  In addition to measuring the reporting levels, 
system satisfaction, confidence levels and perceived risk of audit in each of the four 
conditions (manual, no alerts, low alerts and high alerts), the experiment required each 
participant to fill out a computer anxiety instrument, a general risk preference instrument 
and to report some demographic information.  The data thus gathered was used to assure 
that there were no confounding aspects of the experiment. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Participants 
 A total of 105 subjects participated in the experiment.  All subjects were students 
in an accounting class with a general knowledge of revenues and expense, but no expert 
knowledge of taxes or computerized accounting systems.  Their average age and GPA 
were approximately 21 and 3.00 respectively (see Table 1).  Each subject participated by 
completing the task under one of the experimental treatment conditions of manual 
(pencil, paper & calculator only), tax program with no warning alerts, tax program with 
low level warning alerts or tax program with high level warning alerts. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Participants 
Age, GPA, Classification & Computer Experience 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation
Age 105 18 40 20.90 4.15
GPA 105 2.00 4.00 2.9952 .5003
Classification 
(1=Freshman &c) 
 
105 1 4 2.10 .82
Number of 
Computer 
Classes Taken 
105 0 5 1.34 1.15
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Deduction Levels 
Participants were asked to make deductions in the categories of advertising, 
automobile, parking & tolls, insurance, materials and utilities just as a taxpayer with a 
home-based business might claim expenses on a Schedule C.  The amounts of each 
category’s deduction (and the total of all deductions) claimed by the participants were 
averaged within each of the four experimental treatment conditions (see Table 2).  The 
averages in each category are compared between each of the four experimental treatment 
conditions to test the first three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis one states that participants using a tax program without warning 
alerts will have higher claims than subjects using a manual system.  While the 
descriptive statistics suggest that deductions are lower and higher in different categories 
with aggregate overall lower claims from subjects using a tax program, there is no 
statistical support for regarding those apparent differences as significant (see Table 3).  
There are several explanations for these results, but there is no conclusive statement to 
be made about the veracity of the first hypothesis.    
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Deductions Taken 
 
Panel A: Manual Treatment 
 
Item:     N: Mean: Minimum:  Maximum:  
Advertising  38   8.76         0  12.00 
Automobile  38 57.17           11.9  85.68 
Parking & Tolls  38   4.04             0               7.00 
Insurance  38   5.36             0  10.00 
Materials  38   9.17             0             49.00 
Utilities  38   2.34             0.63    5.64 
 Total:  38 93.03           33.5           121.86 
 
Panel B: Computerized System with No Warning Alerts 
 
Item:     N: Mean: Minimum:  Maximum:  
Advertising  22 10.15         0  12.00 
Automobile  22 51.71           27.2  68.00 
Parking & Tolls  22   4.00             0               7.00 
Insurance  22   2.98             1  10.00 
Materials  22 11.83               0             49.00 
Utilities  22   2.06             0.02    5.83 
 Total:  22 84.96           44.79           184.05  
 
Panel C: Computerized System with Low Level Warning Alerts 
 
Item:     N: Mean: Minimum:  Maximum:  
Advertising  21   3.43         0  12.00 
Automobile  21 28.75             3.93  75.50 
Parking & Tolls  21   1.19             0               5.00 
Insurance  21   2.29             1  10.00 
Materials  21   3.10               0             21.00 
Utilities  21   1.82             0.63    4.75 
 Total:  21 42.57           16.78  96.25 
          
Panel D: Computerized System with High Level Warning Alerts 
 
Item:     N: Mean: Minimum:  Maximum:  
Advertising  24 11.17         0  12.00 
Automobile  24 74.58           56.4  113.28 
Parking & Tolls  24   4.88             2               5.00 
Insurance  24   8.19             0  10.00 
Materials  24   7.58               0             10.00 
Utilities  24   3.26             1    4.8 
 Total:  24      111.23           62.9    131.7 
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TABLE 3 
ANOVA for Deductions Taken 
Manual versus Computerized System with No Warning Alerts 
 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean Square F Sig.
Advertising Between 
Groups
23.254 1 23.254 .895 .348
Within 
Groups
1506.746 58 25.978
Total 1530.000 59
Automobile Between
Groups
105.942 1 105.942 .224 .638
Within 
Groups
27436.766 58 473.048
Total 27542.707 59
Parking & 
Tolls
Between 
Groups
7.177E-04 1 7.177E-04 .000 .990
Within 
Groups
264.849 58 4.566
Total 264.850 59
Insurance Between 
Groups
85.392 1 85.392 6.390 .014
Within 
Groups
775.078 58 13.363
Total 860.469 59
Materials Between 
Groups
33.963 1 33.963 .303 .584
Within 
Groups
6503.228 58 112.125
Total 6537.191 59
Utilities Between 
Groups
1.312 1 1.312 .650 .424
Within 
Groups
117.115 58 2.019
Total 118.427 59
TOTAL Between 
Groups
599.255 1 599.255 .605 .440
Within 
Groups
57488.138 58 991.175
Total 58087.393 59
 
 
Although the results do not establish any relationship of lack thereof with 
statistical certainty, there seems a suggestion that the substitution of expert system as 
surrogate for paid professional was not valid for applying the various theories of known 
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effects that paid professionals have on taxpayer behavior.  This would seem obvious if 
the expert system was seen as offering no more a tool for use by the taxpayer than would 
mere paper and pencil.  That is, if without the guidance or direction of warning alerts, 
the simple tax program was not capable of the technology dominance necessary for 
influencing reporting behavior the way a paid professional influences a taxpayer. 
Table 4 shows the results of an ANOVA for deductions taken, comparing manual 
preparation versus using a computerized system with warning alerts triggered at low 
thresholds.  Table 5 shows the results of an ANOVA for deductions taken, comparing 
manual preparation versus using a computerized system with warning alerts triggered at 
high thresholds.  As shown, using an expert system computer program with warning 
alerts significantly affects the amount of deductions taken in some categories.    
Hypothesis two states that subjects using tax programs with warning alerts 
triggered at the lowest threshold of use will have lower claims than those using tax 
programs without warning alerts.  As predicted, the descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 2 indicate that the claims do go down overall and in all categories when a tax 
program has easily triggered (low-level) warning alerts.  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
for hypothesis two is presented in Table 6.  While claims in the categories of insurance 
and utilities are not shown to be significant, the statistical significance of all other 
differences is below the .001 level with the category of materials below the .05 level. 
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TABLE 4 
 
ANOVA for Deductions Taken 
Manual versus Computerized System with Low Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Advertising Between 
Groups
351.485 1 351.485 12.123 .001
Within 
Groups
1652.617 57 28.993
Total 2004.102 58
Automobile Between 
Groups
9796.864 1 9796.864 18.715 .000
Within 
Groups
29838.884 57 523.489
Total 39635.748 58
Parking & 
Tolls
Between 
Groups
102.799 1 102.799 22.967 .000
Within 
Groups
255.133 57 4.476
Total 357.932 58
Insurance Between 
Groups
116.538 1 116.538 7.858 .007
Within 
Groups
845.309 57 14.830
Total 961.847 58
Materials Between 
Groups
460.050 1 460.050 6.242 .015
Within 
Groups
4201.228 57 73.706
Total 4661.278 58
Utilities Between 
Groups
2.803 1 2.803 1.583 .213
Within 
Groups
100.882 57 1.770
Total 103.685 58
TOTAL Between 
Groups
31169.948 1 31169.948 35.811 .000
Within 
Groups
49613.317 57 870.409
Total 80783.265 58
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TABLE 5 
 
ANOVA for Deductions Taken 
Manual versus Computerized System with High Warning Alerts 
 
 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Advertising Between 
Groups
102.548 1 102.548 5.015 .029
Within 
Groups
1226.807 60 20.447
Total 1329.355 61
Automobile Between 
Groups
5263.959 1 5263.959 11.903 .001
Within 
Groups
26534.238 60 442.237
Total 31798.197 61
Parking & 
Tolls
Between 
Groups
12.658 1 12.658 4.507 .038
Within 
Groups
168.520 60 2.809
Total 181.177 61
Insurance Between 
Groups
129.442 1 129.442 8.703 .005
Within 
Groups
892.429 60 14.874
Total 1021.872 61
Materials Between 
Groups
26.903 1 26.903 .413 .523
Within 
Groups
3906.303 60 65.105
Total 3933.206 61
Utilities Between 
Groups
14.283 1 14.283 8.110 .006
Within 
Groups
105.676 60 1.761
Total 119.959 61
TOTAL Between 
Groups
6274.296 1 6274.296 8.313 .005
Within 
Groups
45286.067 60 754.768
Total 51560.363 61
 
 
  
29
TABLE 6 
 
ANOVA for Deductions Taken 
Computerized Systems with No Warning Alerts versus Low Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Advertising Between 
Groups
438.654 1 438.654 16.524 .000
Within 
Groups
1088.416 41 26.547
Total 1527.070 42
Automobile Between 
Groups
6269.329 1 6269.329 16.462 .000
Within 
Groups
15613.940 41 380.828
Total 21883.269 42
Parking & 
Tolls
Between 
Groups
82.086 1 82.086 16.812 .000
Within 
Groups
200.193 41 4.883
Total 282.279 42
Insurance Between 
Groups
2.271 1 2.271 .343 .561
Within 
Groups
271.340 41 6.618
Total 273.611 42
Materials Between 
Groups
587.302 1 587.302 7.155 .011
Within 
Groups
3365.619 41 82.088
Total 3952.922 42
Utilities Between 
Groups
.237 1 .237 .122 .729
Within 
Groups
79.418 41 1.937
Total 79.655 42
TOTAL Between 
Groups
18457.450 1 18457.450 26.436 .000
Within 
Groups
28625.636 41 698.186
Total 47083.086 42
 
This indicates several things relative to the use of low threshold warning alerts as 
compared to a simple tax program without warning alerts.  Most basically, that taxpayers 
respond to warning alerts at all and that warning alerts have a significant influence upon 
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taxpayer behavior.  More importantly, taxpayers can be made predictably less aggressive 
in their reporting by including warning alerts as part of tax programs.  The suggestion 
that warning alerts triggered at low thresholds are most effective at encouraging minimal 
reporting aggression is indicated by these results compared to results of testing 
hypothesis 3.    
Hypothesis 3 states that subjects using tax programs with warning alerts triggered 
at high thresholds will have higher claims than those using tax programs without 
warning alerts.  As predicted, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 indicate that 
the claims go up overall and in every category but the materials category when a tax 
program with high threshold warning alerts is used.  Analysis of variance (ANOVA) for 
hypothesis three is presented in Table 7.  While claims in the categories of advertising, 
parking & tolls and materials are not shown to be significant, the statistical significance 
of all other differences is below the .01 level.  
In contrast to low threshold warning alerts, high threshold warning alerts 
encourage more aggressive reporting.  ANOVA results are shown in Table 8.  This 
affirms the findings from hypothesis 2 that taxpayers respond to warning alerts as 
opposed to tax programs without warning alerts with statistically different behavior.  
Further, the contrast highlights the supposition that warning alerts triggered at lower 
thresholds are more effective in minimizing aggressive reporting among taxpayers.   
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TABLE 7 
ANOVA for Deductions Taken 
Computerized Systems with No Warning Alerts versus High Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Advertising Between 
Groups
20.872 1 20.872 1.386 .245
Within 
Groups
662.606 44 15.059
Total 683.478 45
Automobile Between 
Groups
5392.325 1 5392.325 19.275 .000
Within 
Groups
12309.294 44 279.757
Total 17701.619 45
Parking & 
Tolls
Between 
Groups
9.725 1 9.725 3.767 .059
Within 
Groups
113.580 44 2.581
Total 123.304 45
Insurance Between 
Groups
339.939 1 339.939 46.967 .000
Within 
Groups
318.461 44 7.238
Total 658.399 45
Materials Between 
Groups
97.442 1 97.442 1.396 .244
Within 
Groups
3070.695 44 69.789
Total 3168.137 45
Utilities Between 
Groups
19.167 1 19.167 10.015 .003
Within 
Groups
84.212 44 1.914
Total 103.379 45
TOTAL Between 
Groups
8498.947 1 8498.947 15.390 .000
Within 
Groups
24298.386 44 552.236
Total 32797.332 45
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TABLE 8 
ANOVA for Deductions Taken 
Computerized Systems with Low Warning Alerts versus High Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Advertising Between 
Groups
670.635 1 670.635 35.669 .000
Within 
Groups
808.476 43 18.802
Total 1479.111 44
Automobile Between 
Groups
23524.845 1 23524.845 68.761 .000
Within 
Groups
14711.412 43 342.126
Total 38236.257 44
Parking & 
Tolls
Between 
Groups
152.048 1 152.048 62.949 .000
Within 
Groups
103.863 43 2.415
Total 255.911 44
Insurance Between 
Groups
390.108 1 390.108 43.157 .000
Within 
Groups
388.692 43 9.039
Total 778.800 44
Materials Between 
Groups
224.765 1 224.765 12.573 .001
Within 
Groups
768.695 43 17.877
Total 993.459 44
Utilities Between 
Groups
23.244 1 23.244 14.703 .000
Within 
Groups
67.978 43 1.581
Total 91.222 44
TOTAL Between 
Groups
52796.794 1 52796.794 138.232 .000
Within 
Groups
16423.565 43 381.943
Total 69220.358 44
 
 
 
Satisfaction Levels 
 Participants in any of the experimental treatment conditions using a tax program 
were asked to report their satisfaction on four validated scales: perceived accuracy of the 
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program, satisfaction with the accuracy of the program, user friendliness of the program 
and ease of use of the program.  The first two of these scales measure the construct of 
“information content” satisfaction while the latter two of these scales measure the 
construct of “ease of use” satisfaction.  The Likert scale numbers of satisfaction reported 
for each scale were averaged within each of the experimental treatment conditions (see 
Table 9).  These averages were then compared to test hypothesis four. 
 
TABLE 9 
Descriptive Statistics 
Satisfaction Reports 
 
Satisfied Accurate Information
Content 
Friendly Easy Ease of 
Use 
TOTAL
NO 
 Warning Alerts 
Mean 4.45 4.55 9.00 4.59 4.68 9.27 18.27
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Std. 
Dev.
.51 .51 .76 .50 .48 .77 1.28
LOW Threshold 
Warning Alerts
Mean 4.29 4.05 8.33 4.29 4.57 8.86 17.19
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Std. 
Dev.
.64 .97 1.46 .78 .51 1.01 1.94
HIGH Threshold  
Warning Alerts
Mean 4.29 4.79 9.08 4.42 4.67 9.08 18.17
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Std. 
Dev.
1.12 .41 1.25 .65 .48 1.06 1.40
Total Mean 4.34 4.48 8.82 4.43 4.64 9.07 17.90
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
Std. 
Dev.
.81 .73 1.22 .66 .48 .96 1.61
 
 
Hypothesis 4a states that participants using tax programs with warning alerts will 
report higher “information content” satisfaction than participants using tax programs 
without alerts.  Hypothesis 4b states that participants using tax programs with warning 
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alerts will report lower “ease of use” satisfaction than participants using tax programs 
without alerts.  The descriptive statistics show that there is lower “information content” 
satisfaction with low threshold warning alerts as compared to no warning alerts, but that 
it is higher with high threshold warning alerts.  Participants using tax programs with 
either type of warning alerts reported lower “ease of use” satisfaction.  These differences 
are significant only for those using tax programs with low threshold warning alerts. (see 
Table 10). 
Because the experiment confirmed that low threshold warnings yield the most 
conservative reporting, the significant findings of participants in that experimental 
condition perceive lower information content is of particular interest.  This contradicts 
the expectation that more guidance and direction would suggest a greater expertise of the 
system and thus create a higher perception of information content.  Possibly, the more 
prevalent warning alerts were perceived as criticisms that confused or undermined the 
confidence of participants rather than suggest a greater expertise. 
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TABLE 10 
ANOVA for Satisfaction 
 
Panel A: No Warning Alerts versus Low Threshold Warning Alerts 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Information 
Content 
Between 
Groups
4.775 1 4.775 3.581 .066
Within 
Groups
54.667 41 1.333
Total 59.442 42
Ease of  
Use 
Between 
Groups
1.856 1 1.856 2.310 .136
Within 
Groups
32.935 41 .803
Total 34.791 42
 
Panel B: No Warning Alerts versus High Threshold Warning Alerts 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Information 
Content 
Between 
Groups
7.971E-02 1 7.971E-
02
.073 .788
Within 
Groups
47.833 44 1.087
Total 47.913 45
Ease of  
Use 
Between 
Groups
.412 1 .412 .474 .495
Within 
Groups
38.197 44 .868
Total 38.609 45
 
Panel C: Low Threshold Warning Alerts versus High Threshold Warning Alerts 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Information 
Content 
Between 
Groups
6.300 1 6.300 3.451 .070
Within 
Groups
78.500 43 1.826
Total 84.800 44
Ease of  
Use 
Between 
Groups
.573 1 .573 .531 .470
Within 
Groups
46.405 43 1.079
Total 46.978 44
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Total satisfaction was calculated as the addition of all scales in the satisfaction 
instrument used.  Although not significant in both cases, the total satisfaction reported by 
participants was lower for groups using tax programs with either type of warning alert 
compared to those using a tax program with no warning alert (see Table 9).  Supporting 
the total satisfaction numbers are the four component individual scale reports that are 
lower for groups using tax programs with either type of warning alert compared to the 
group using a tax program without warning alerts, with the one exception of the accurate 
scale reported by the high threshold group. 
The differences in perceived accuracy of the tax program, considered lower for 
the group with low threshold warning alerts and higher for the group with high threshold 
warning alerts, are significant at the .05 and .10 levels respectively (see Tables 11&12).  
These findings exactly contradict the predictions that the more obvious system 
interactions and guidance provided by warning alerts triggered at low thresholds would 
create a greater sense of involvement with an expert system and thus greater accuracy, 
the opposite prediction applying to warning alerts triggered only at high thresholds.  This 
suggests that something about the nature of the warning alerts, other than the frequency 
of their support and guidance, is influencing the participants’ judgments of accuracy 
because expert systems used to support financial decision making have been shown to 
inflate perceptions of accuracy (Lawrence & Sim, 1999).         
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TABLE 11 
ANOVA for Individual Satisfaction Scales 
Computerized Systems with No Warning Alerts versus Low Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
ACCURATE Between 
Groups
2.663 1 2.663 4.473 .041
Within 
Groups
24.407 41 .595
Total 27.070 42
Satisfied Between 
Groups
.306 1 .306 .914 .345
Within 
Groups
13.740 41 .335
Total 14.047 42
FRIENDLY Between 
Groups
1.001 1 1.001 2.331 .135
Within 
Groups
17.604 41 .429
Total 18.605 42
EASY Between 
Groups
.131 1 .131 .541 .466
Within 
Groups
9.916 41 .242
Total 10.047 42
TOTAL Between 
Groups
12.584 1 12.584 4.708 .036
Within 
Groups
109.602 41 2.673
Total 122.186 42
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TABLE 12 
 
ANOVA for Individual Satisfaction Scales 
Computerized Systems with No Warning Alerts versus High Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
ACCURATE Between 
Groups
.696 1 .696 3.253 .078
Within 
Groups
9.413 44 .214
Total 10.109 45
Satisfied Between 
Groups
.305 1 .305 .389 .536
Within 
Groups
34.413 44 .782
Total 34.717 45
FRIENDLY Between 
Groups
.348 1 .348 1.012 .320
Within 
Groups
15.152 44 .344
Total 15.500 45
EASY Between 
Groups
2.635E-03 1 2.635E-03 .011 .915
Within 
Groups
10.106 44 .230
Total 10.109 45
TOTAL Between 
Groups
.129 1 .129 .071 .791
Within 
Groups
79.697 44 1.811
Total 79.826 45
 
  
One explanation might be that the higher frequency of warning alerts interrupting 
the participant doing a simple tax reporting operation suggested more strongly that there 
was something wrong even though more conservative reporting was used to satisfy the 
warning alert trigger.  Another explanation might be that the mere presence of warning 
alerts provides an inflated sense of accuracy whether triggered often or at all, so that it is 
the existence rather than the use of an expert system that creates the false perception 
increased accuracy.  This finding, of more conservative reporting with tax programs 
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using low threshold alerts combined with a decrease in the user’s perception of accuracy, 
parallels the well-known problem of taxpayers being influenced to act against their own 
preferences when employing paid professionals (Olshewsky, 2000).  Table 13 shows the 
results of an ANOVA comparing perceptions of accuracy between participants using 
computerized systems with warning alerts triggered at low versus high thresholds. 
 
TABLE 13 
ANOVA for Individual Satisfaction Scales 
Computerized Systems with Low Warning Alerts versus High Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
ACCURATE Between 
Groups
6.200 1 6.200 11.637 .001
Within 
Groups
22.911 43 .533
Total 29.111 44
Satisfied Between 
Groups
3.968E-04 1 3.968E-04 .000 .983
Within 
Groups
37.244 43 .866
Total 37.244 44
FRIENDLY Between 
Groups
.192 1 .192 .373 .544
Within 
Groups
22.119 43 .514
Total 22.311 44
EASY Between 
Groups
.102 1 .102 .417 .522
Within 
Groups
10.476 43 .244
Total 10.578 44
TOTAL Between 
Groups
10.673 1 10.673 3.806 .058
Within 
Groups
120.571 43 2.804
Total 131.244 44
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Covariate Interactions 
 Individual differences among the participants were analyzed to determine any 
possible influence on the results.  Personal risk preferences, computer anxiety levels and 
traditionally examined demographics were considered.  These results are shown in 
Tables 14, 15 & 16.  No significance was found in the variance of any of these factors 
between any of the experimental groups except the risk aversion of participants in the 
group using tax programs with high threshold warning alerts (see Tables 15 & 16).   
Those participants in the experimental group using tax programs with high 
threshold warning alerts scored lower on the total risk scale, i.e., they had greater risk 
aversion, than both the group using tax programs without warning alerts and the group 
using tax programs with low threshold warning alerts (see Table 17).  It is surprising that 
one experimental condition would have a group with such different risk preferences as 
such factors are commonly assumed to have been evenly distributed over groups through 
random assignment (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  Because the purpose of the experiment 
is to test a participants willingness to risk scrutiny under different treatment conditions, 
the predisposition of a participant to risk, independent of the experimental treatment, is 
certainly relevant to the study. 
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TABLE 14 
ANOVA for Possible Covariates 
No Warning Alerts versus Low Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Age Between 
Groups
6.091E-03 1 6.091E-03 .001 .978
Within 
Groups
310.738 41 7.579
Total 310.744 42
Class 
 
Between 
Groups
4.233E-02 1 4.233E-02 .088 .768
Within 
Groups
19.725 41 .481
Total 19.767 42
GPA Between 
Groups
.169 1 .169 .660 .421
Within 
Groups
10.485 41 .256
Total 10.654 42
Computer 
Experience 
Between 
Groups
5.034E-03 1 5.034E-03 .007 .933
Within 
Groups
28.693 41 .700
Total 28.698 42
Computer 
Anxiety 
Between 
Groups
5.155E-02 1 5.155E-02 .007 .935
Within 
Groups
316.693 41 7.724
Total 316.744 42
Risk  
Preference 
Between 
Groups
4.470 1 4.470 .178 .675
Within 
Groups
1028.693 41 25.090
Total 1033.163 42
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TABLE 15 
 
ANOVA for Possible Covariates 
No Warning Alerts versus High Warning Alerts 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Age Between 
Groups
.179 1 .179 .008 .931
Within 
Groups
1039.125 44 23.616
Total 1039.304 45
Class Between 
Groups
8.070E-03 1 8.070E-03 .013 .910
Within 
Groups
27.731 44 .630
Total 27.739 45
GPA Between 
Groups
.112 1 .112 .519 .475
Within 
Groups
9.513 44 .216
Total 9.625 45
Computer 
Experience 
Between 
Groups
1.647E-04 1 1.647E-04 .000 .991
Within 
Groups
59.413 44 1.350
Total 59.413 45
Computer 
Anxiety 
Between 
Groups
8.712 1 8.712 .849 .362
Within 
Groups
451.288 44 10.257
Total 460.000 45
Risk 
Preference 
Between 
Groups
296.160 1 296.160 15.717 .000
Within 
Groups
829.080 44 18.843
Total 1125.239 45
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TABLE 16 
ANOVA for Possible Covariates 
Low Warning Alerts versus High Warning Alerts 
 
 
Sum of
Squares
df Mean 
Square
F Sig.
Age Between 
Groups
.248 1 .248 .014 .908
Within 
Groups
782.863 43 18.206
Total 783.111 44
Class Between 
Groups
8.929E-02 1 8.929E-02 .175 .678
Within 
Groups
21.911 43 .510
Total 22.000 44
GPA Between 
Groups
.563 1 .563 2.032 .161
Within 
Groups
11.911 43 .277
Total 12.474 44
Computer 
Experience 
Between 
Groups
3.571E-03 1 3.571E-03 .003 .956
Within 
Groups
49.196 43 1.144
Total 49.200 44
Computer 
Anxiety 
Between 
Groups
9.906 1 9.906 1.193 .281
Within 
Groups
357.071 43 8.304
Total 366.978 44
Risk 
Preference 
Between 
Groups
220.248 1 220.248 9.012 .004
Within 
Groups
1050.863 43 24.439
Total 1271.111 44
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TABLE 17 
Descriptive Statistics 
Risk Preference Reports 
 
Mean N Std. Deviation
Tax Programs with NO Warning Alerts  19.45 22 4.38
Tax Programs with LOW Threshold Warning Alerts 18.81 21 5.59
Tax Programs with HIGH Threshold Warning Alerts 14.38 24 4.30
Total 17.43 67 5.23
 
 In this case of an experimental group accepting greater risk notwithstanding a 
greater predisposition to avoid risk, the unexpected confound lends power to the results.  
Participants using tax programs with high threshold warning alerts were found to take 
significantly higher deductions in ever category, other than materials, thus taking 
significantly higher risks of scrutiny and resultant loss.  This willingness to enter into 
high-risk behavior is counter-intuitive given the relatively stronger unwillingness of 
participants to enter into such behavior and strengthens the findings that tax programs 
with high threshold warning alerts encourage aggressive reporting.   
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V. SUMMARY 
Conclusions 
Because taxpayers are using tax programs in growing numbers and this use of an 
expert system can substitute for employing tax professionals in some cases, some effects 
of using these tax programs are expected to be similar to those occurring when 
professionals are used.  These effects can include the well-documented problem of tax 
reporting that is contrary to taxpayers’ preferences  (Olshewsky, 2000).  This study 
shows how tax programs can be designed to better serve the taxpayers’ needs through 
attention to the type of warning alerts used. 
There are four key findings from this research: 1) the presence of warning alerts 
in a tax program promotes different taxpayer behavior than if there are no warning alerts, 
2) warning alerts in a tax program, triggered at low versus high levels, have a distinct 
influence upon the level of deductions claimed by taxpayers, 3) the presence of warning 
alerts in a tax program promotes different taxpayer perceptions of accuracy of the 
program than if there are no warning alerts and 4) warning alerts in a tax program, 
triggered at low versus high levels, will influence the level of information content 
perceived by taxpayers.  These findings, when considered together, validate the 
proposed framework for the future study of taxpayer behavior in computerized 
accounting system environments and affirm the importance of future research in this 
area.   
The results indicate the potential for improving taxpayer behavior through well-
designed tax programs.  Taxpayers typically seek to be in a safer, more conservative 
  
46
reporting position.  Low threshold warning alerts encourage more conservative reporting 
while high threshold warning alerts encourage more aggressive reporting.  This study 
shows that the actual effect of warning alerts can cause behavior contrary to taxpayers’ 
preferences, and at the same time lead to taxpayers perceiving that they are reporting 
conservatively when in fact they are not.  Thus, the designers of expert system tax 
programs should carefully consider the effects of warning alerts and other instructions 
presented to taxpayers. 
 
Limitations 
The question of whether conservatism serves the true interests of the client 
cannot be answered by a study of this type.  This study merely serves to further 
demonstrate the extreme to which taxpayers are swayed in their judgments by perceived 
aspects of the tax software that are irrelevant to the facts of their tax situations.  Exactly 
what taxpayers need to be given by way of guidance and direction to comport their 
behavior to the tax laws is a critical question of public policy.  
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APPENDIX A 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION PROVIDED TO PARTICIPANTS 
 This exercise assumes that you have been working at home for the Company 
taking orders for, assembling and delivering gift baskets.  You have already paid the 
regular rate for that work, but you are also entitled to a monthly bonus based on your 
activity level each month.  Your bonus pay must be reduced by charges that you have 
not paid for such as the monthly franchise fee you are responsible for.  Your monthly 
pay slip voucher (in the accompanying envelope) shows these amounts along with other 
information.   
 
You are allowed to claim credits in addition to the bonus you are due.  These are 
based on various aspects of your home business activity.  There is a Claim Form with 
line-by-line instructions in your envelope to summarize your aggregate claim for money 
due to you.  You work in an urban area with population between 100,000 and 250,000. 
 
You may take credit for expenses you have incurred only if they are directly 
related to work you have done.  Receipts related to these expenses are included in your 
envelope.  Not all receipts or receipt numbers necessarily apply to credits you can claim.  
Detailed rules for using claiming credits are spelled out in the line-by-line instructions. 
 
Because you have been a franchisee for less than five years, you have a 30% 
chance of having your claim form scrutinized for unauthorized claims.  If you are 
unreasonable in any of the amounts you claim for reimbursement, that chance increases 
to 70% chance.  If you clearly attempt to defraud the Company, your claim for 
reimbursement will definitely (100%) be scrutinized.  Failing to exclude expenses for 
personal use (not business use) is an example of what can increase the chance for 
scrutiny.  In the event that an incorrect amount is found as the result of any scrutiny, 
your requested pay-off will be reduced by twice the amount of the improper claim.    
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 Please ask any questions about how the pay-off works? 
 
 You have contracted with the Company for the franchise rights to do a part-time 
job creating and delivering gift baskets.  You use baskets, potpourris, soaps and trinkets 
that are delivered to your house by the Company.  You are also supplied with shredded 
paper for the baskets and a shrink-wrap that requires heating to seal around the finished 
product.     
 
You must use the claim form to record and calculate any payment due to you. 
 
 When you have filled out your claim form, print it and turn it in. 
 
 Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TUTORIAL  
 
(JUNE FINANCIAL RECORDS AND LINE-BY-LINE INSTRUCTIONS) 
 
Claim Form 
Line-by-Line Instructions 
 
1) Bonus Earned  
On line 1 of the Claim Form, place the amount of Bonus you have earned for the 
month.  This amount is reported to you as Item 5 on your Pay Slip Voucher.  The bonus 
is based on how much you worked over the minimum expected work level. 
Your June Pay Slip Voucher is reproduced on the next page: 
Pay Slip Voucher 
June 2002 
 
1)                                                  5)         
    Employee ID Code:                     Monthly Bonus Earned:   
           87068                                                   $40.00 
 
2)                                                   6)     
    Franchise Fee Due:                      Franchise ID Number:        
                 $35.00                                                1205 
 
3)                                                   7)            
    Unpaid Wages:                             Local Surcharges:  
                  -0-                                                       -0- 
 
4)                                                   8)           
     Previous Amount Due:                Late Payment Charges: 
                 -0-                                                        -0- 
 
 
 
2) Franchise Fees Due   
On line 2 of the Claim Form, place the amount of the Franchise Fees you have 
been charged for working under the national contract.  This amount has been based on 
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the amount of work you have done, calculated as a percentage of the minimum expected 
work level plus a percentage of work done over that minimum expected work level. 
 
 
3)  Franchise Credits 
No entry is required on this line, the following lines are amounts of money you 
have spent in doing your work.  You are entitled to a percentage reimbursement of those 
expenses. 
  
4) Standard Promotion Allowance  
  Because you are operating this business in your home, it promotes the 
franchise in the area where you live.  There are different ways to claim a 
promotion credit, but the easiest is this Standard method.  Using the Standard 
method is safe because the Company will tell you if you qualify for a larger 
Promotion Allowance under a different method.  To use the Standard Promotion 
Allowance, simply find the size of your franchise territory (where you live) and 
whether you are in a rural or urban area on the Standard Promotion Allowance 
Table provided on the next page.  The dollar figure for your size & type of 
franchise territory should be entered on line 4 of the Claim Form. 
 
 
/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/ 
Standard “Promotion” Allowance Table 
 
Population:  <100,000  100,000 – 250,000  250,000 – 1,000,000 >1,000,000  
 
Urban: $1 $2 $3 $4 
Rural: $3 $4 $5 $6 
/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/ 
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5) Advertising  
In addition to the Standard Promotion Allowance, any money that you spent for 
the active promotion of the business is allowed as a separate credit.  Examples would 
include having business cards printed, sponsoring a sporting event that put the Company 
logo in their programs, or placing a business advertisement in a local newspaper.   
June’s Advertising expense claim is supported by the receipt reproduced below: 
 
 
THE BATTALIAN 
The Independent Student Voice of Texas A&M University 
CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS  
****************************** 
Paid 6-4-02:                   $15 
****************************** 
TEXT: 
“Say it with Potpourri.  She’ll always remember the smell of the summer 
breeze.  Same Day Delivery ” 
 
 
6) Automobile Mileage  
Credits are allowed for car mileage driven for the delivery of product.  This 
mileage must be for business purposes only and not for personal reasons.  For example, 
if in one day you make four deliveries that require 8 miles of driving and you also go to 
lunch at a restaurant that is 3 miles out of the way, then you have a total car mileage 
driven of 11 miles that day, but 3 miles are considered personal and only 8 miles can be 
used in calculating the Automobile Mileage Credit. 
You have been given a mileage log that allows you to record the odometer 
readings of your automobile each month and thereby determine the total mileage you 
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have driven in each month.  You must also keep track of how many of those miles were 
driven for deliveries versus how many were driven for personal reasons. 
Different people have different driving habits, so it is recommended that all 
deliveries be made with only one single automobile.   
The worksheet on the next page can be used for calculating the amount of 
Automobile Mileage Credit to claim:  
 
 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
Automobile Mileage Credit Worksheet 
 
1. Total mileage driven in the month (from the Mileage Record provided)  ________ 
 
2. Total mileage driven for personal reasons (include personal errands)     (________) 
 
3. Total mileage driven for deliveries (subtract line 2 from line 1 above)     ________ 
 Enter the number from line 3 above on the Claim Form line 6) a) 
 
4. Multiply the number on line 3 above by 0.34 (34 cents per mile)             ________ 
 Enter the number from line 4 above on the Claim Form line 6) b)  
 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
 
A minimum strategy would be to assume that a fourth or less of the recorded miles were 
used for business (not personal) use, and a maximum strategy would be to assume that 
nearly all of the miles were used for business (not personal) use.  The worksheet on the 
previous page can be used to calculate the number claimed under each of these 
assumptions using the number for June from the following Mileage Record: 
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MILEAGE RECORD 
 
DATE:                                      ODOMETER          MILEAGE 
 
January 31                                               3917                     
 
February 28                                             4135                 218 _  
 
March 31                                                 4346                 211_ 
 
April 30                                                   4421                 _75_ 
 
May 31                                                    4589                 168_ 
 
June 30                                                    5044                 455_ 
 
July 31                                                     5346                 302_ 
 
August 31                                                5678                 332_ 
 
September 30                                          ____                 ____        
 
October 31                                              ____                 ____ 
 
November 30                                          ____                 ____        
 
December 31                                           ____                 ____ 
 
 
For the Minimum Claim, 455 (the total mileage driven in June) can be considered about 
78% from personal driving use of the automobile.  Putting (455 x 78%) 355 on line two 
of the worksheet on the previous page leaves 100 miles on line 3 for delivery miles 
driven.  That yields a Credit of 34 to claim on line 6 of the Claim Form. 
The Maximum suggests only 12%, a minimal 55 of the total 455 miles, was used for 
personal driving while 400 miles of delivery use is reported on line 3 of the previous 
page’s worksheet. 
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7) Parking & Tolls 
 Any money paid for parking or tolls required for the delivery of any 
product is allowed as a Franchise Credit on the Claim Form, such as for parking in a 
parking garage when making a delivery to an office address.   
The Minimum strategy is to claim no Parking & Tolls amount since there is no receipt 
for it, and the maximum strategy is to assume that there must have been some Parking & 
Tolls amount to claim even without a receipt.  So zero (or blank) is reported at the 
Minimum and 10 is reported at the Maximum.  Here, 10 is a number unsupported by 
receipts or documents, but there is some vague basis to assume that there may have been 
a parking and tolls expense like this.  In other words, it is not necessarily true, but it 
stands to reason.    
 
8) Insurance  
Insurance directly related the protection of the product from loss by theft or 
casualty is allowed as a Franchise Credit.  General insurance is not allowed, such as on 
your automobile, house, or life, unless it is additional insurance purchased to cover the 
additional business. 
The Insurance claim comes from the June invoice for insurance reproduced below with 
the minimum strategy assuming that the renters insurance covers all personal property 
in the house of which one tenth is work related materials.  The maximum strategy 
assumes that the renters insurance is only for the work related materials in the house.  
Because you have already claimed 34 cents per mile on your automobile, there is no 
separate claim for auto insurance.  
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Comprehensive Insurance Company 
For all your insurance needs  
You’re covered with us. 
 
Statement Date: June 1st  
 
Renters Insurance:   $10           Expires August 1       
Auto Insurance:         12           Expires July 1 
Life Insurance            15          Expires August 1 
 
Due and Payable:     $37   
 
 
 
9) Materials & Supplies 
The Company supplies the materials although Franchise Credits are allowed if additional 
materials are purchased.  Supplies required for business use in your house 
because you have no other office are also a source of Franchise Credits.  Again, 
no personal purchases are allowed, but costs of materials used exclusively for 
making product or exclusively for office work, such as filing the Claim Form, 
can be listed on line 9.       
10) Utilities  
Utilities expenses related to the making of product are sources of Franchise 
Credits.  The proportion of the total utilities that can be taken as credits are that 
percentage of your total home that you use making product times the portion of days that 
you work.  For example, if you make product in a kitchen that is one of four rooms in 
your home, and you work 10 days a month, then a $20 utility bill would be a Franchise 
Credit of 25% (one out of four rooms) times 33% (10 out of 30 days) times $20 or .25 x 
.33 x 20 = $2.06, so $2.06 would be entered on line 10 of the Claim Form.  The 
following worksheet may be used for calculating the amount of Utilities Credit to claim.     
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*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
Utilities Credit Worksheet 
 
1. Total Utilities for the month                    ________ 
 
2. Percentage of home used in making product  ________ 
 
3. Line 1 multiplied by Line 2      ________ 
  
4. Number of days of the month worked ________ 
 
5. Line 4 divided by 30 (days/month) ________ 
   
6. Line 3 multiplied by Line 4 (enter here and on Line 10 of the Claim Form) 
 _____
___ 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
The two Utilities figures on the Claim Form can be calculated from the worksheet on the 
previous page using numbers on the utilities bill reproduced below.  The minimum 
strategy assumes that the work is mostly done in the kitchen (one of five rooms in the 
house) and that work is only being done about a fourth of the days of the month.  The 
maximum strategy claims that a fourth of the house is used for the work and that work 
was done every day of the month. 
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11) Total Franchise Credits  
 Add lines 4 – 10 and enter the total on line 11 of the Claim Form. 
 
12) Reimbursement Allowance 
 Multiply Total Credits on Line 11 by 15% (0.15) and enter on line 12 of the 
Claim Form. 
 
13) Total Pay-Off Amount 
Subtract the amount on Line 2 from the amount on Line 1 and add that result to 
the amount on Line 12.  The amount on Line 13 of the Claim Form is the combination of 
the numbers on Line 1, Line 2 and Line 12, remembering that the number on Line 2 is 
negative. 
This is the amount of your Earned Bonus that you are requesting to have 
returned to you.   
 
 
 
 
Utility Bill 
June, 2002 
 
 
Last Month’s Charge:                            $17.00 
Last Month’s Payment:                           17.00 
This Month’s Charge:                             18.00 
 
Total Due by June 23, 2002:                   $18.00 
 
Total Due after June 23, 2002:                $23.00                                                    
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General Comments: 
The pay-offs on line 13 of $12.95 for the minimum strategy, and $26.63 for the 
maximum strategy follow mathematically from the numbers entered on earlier lines.  
Those dollar figures on line 13 will be the pay-offs as long as there is no scrutiny of the 
Claim Form. 
If there were scrutiny of the Claim Form, then the resulting effect of that scrutiny is 
shown on line 14.   
 
For the minimum strategy, no correction would result even if there is scrutiny, so 
the pay-off would remain unchanged at $12.95.  For the maximum strategy, IF there is 
scrutiny, the overstatement of Automobile Mileage, the claiming of Parking & Tolls 
with no documentation to support the expenses, the allocation of Insurance costs, and the 
assumed numbers for Utilities calculation would all result in a total reduction of $28.92 
from the pay-off leaving the $2.72 shown on line 15. 
 
Where the maximum is claimed, and IF there is scrutiny, the scrutiny would 
suggest that several credits should be lowered to the total minimum.  Taking out the $10 
Parking & Tolls, $9 of Insurance, $3.50 of Utilities, and $100 of Automobile Mileage 
lowers the reimbursement by the related $18.38.  Because the maximum reporting is the 
most extreme, scrutiny will also cause the highest penalty of $10.53 to be assessed.  This 
brings the total reduction to $28.91 shown on line 14 IF scrutiny occurs.  
 
If you took the minimum approach, then your chances of being scrutinized are 
only 2% and that the results of that scrutiny are to not change the amount of the pay-off.  
If you took a maximum approach, then your chances of being scrutinized could go up to 
48%.  The higher the amount of your claim between the minimum and maximum, the 
higher the chances of being scrutinized between the 2% and 48% range.  The pay-off 
could be reduced depending on how high the amount of credits that you claim.   
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APPENDIX C 
COMPLETED EXAMPLE 
Claim Form 
COMPARISON - June 2002 
         Minimum     Maximum 
 
1) Bonus Earned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __40__    __40__ 
 
2) Franchise Fees Due  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __35__    __35__ 
3) Franchise Credits: 
      Minimum     Maximum 
4) Standard Promotion Allowance . . . . . . . . . ___2__    ___2__ 
 
5) Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __15__    __15__ 
Minimum = 100 miles & Maximum = 400 miles 
6) Automobile Mileage ______ x 34 cents . .  __34__    _136__ 
 
7) Parking & Tolls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___0__    __10__ 
 
8) Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___1__    __10__ 
 
9) Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .______    ______ 
 
10) Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___1__    ___4.50 
 
11) Total Franchise Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __53__    _177.50 
 
12) Reimbursement (Credits x 15%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  __7.95    _26.63 
 
13) Total Pay-Off Amount (IF no Scrutiny) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _12.95    _31.63 
 
14) Effect of Scrutiny (IF any) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___0__    <28.91> 
  
15)   Pay-off IF Scrutiny Occurs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _12.95    ___2.72 
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APPENDIX D 
PRACTICE SET FOR MANUAL COMPLETION OF A CLAIM FORM 
JULY Claim Form   
Line-by-Line Instructions 
 
1) Bonus Earned  
On line 1 of the Claim Form, place the amount of Bonus you have earned for the 
month.  This amount is reported to you as Item 5 on your Pay Slip Voucher.  The bonus 
is based on how much you worked over the minimum expected work level. 
Your July Pay Slip Voucher is reproduced below: 
 
Pay Slip Voucher 
July 2002 
 
1)                                                  5)         
    Employee ID Code:                     Monthly Bonus Earned:   
           87068                                                   $30.00 
 
2)                                                   6)     
    Franchise Fee Due:                      Franchise ID Number:        
                 $26.00                                                1205 
 
3)                                                   7)            
    Unpaid Wages:                             Local Surcharges:  
                  -0-                                                       -0- 
 
4)                                                   8)           
     Previous Amount Due:                Late Payment Charges: 
                 -0-                                                        -0- 
 
 
 
2) Franchise Fees Due   
On line 2 of the Claim Form, place the amount of the Franchise Fees you have 
been charged for working under the national contract.  This amount has been based on 
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the amount of work you have done, calculated as a percentage of the minimum expected 
work level plus a percentage of work done over that minimum expected work level. 
 
 
3)  Franchise Credits 
No entry is required on this line, the following lines are amounts of money you 
have spent in doing your work.  You are entitled to a percentage reimbursement of those 
expenses. 
  
4) Standard Promotion Allowance  
  Because you are operating this business in your home, it promotes the 
franchise in the area where you live.  There are different ways to claim a 
promotion credit, but the easiest is this Standard method.  Using the Standard 
method is safe because the Company will tell you if you qualify for a larger 
Promotion Allowance under a different method.  To use the Standard Promotion 
Allowance, simply find the size of your franchise territory (where you live) and 
whether you are in a rural or urban area on the Standard Promotion Allowance 
Table provided on the next page.  The dollar figure for your size & type of 
franchise territory should be entered on line 4 of the Claim Form. 
 
 
/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/ 
Standard “Promotion” Allowance Table 
 
Population:  <100,000  100,000 – 250,000  250,000 – 1,000,000 >1,000,000  
 
Urban: $1 $2 $3 $4 
Rural: $3 $4 $5 $6 
/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/ 
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5) Advertising  
In addition to the Standard Promotion Allowance, any money that you spent for 
the active promotion of the business is allowed as a separate credit.  Examples would 
include having business cards printed, sponsoring a sporting event that put the Company 
logo in their programs, or placing a business advertisement in a local newspaper.   
There is no receipt to support an Advertising expense claim for July. 
 
6) Automobile Mileage  
Credits are allowed for car mileage driven for the delivery of product.  This 
mileage must be for business purposes only and not for personal reasons.  For example, 
if in one day you make four deliveries that require 8 miles of driving and you also go to 
lunch at a restaurant that is 3 miles out of the way, then you have a total car mileage 
driven of 11 miles that day, but 3 miles are considered personal and only 8 miles can be 
used in calculating the Automobile Mileage Credit. 
You have been given a mileage log that allows you to record the odometer 
readings of your automobile each month and thereby determine the total mileage you 
have driven in each month.  You must also keep track of how many of those miles were 
driven for deliveries versus how many were driven for personal reasons. 
Different people have different driving habits, so it is recommended that all 
deliveries be made with only one single automobile.   
The worksheet on the next page can be used for calculating the amount of 
Automobile Mileage Credit to claim:  
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*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
Automobile Mileage Credit Worksheet 
 
1. Total mileage driven in the month (from the Mileage Record provided)  ________ 
 
2. Total mileage driven for personal reasons (include personal errands)     (________) 
 
3. Total mileage driven for deliveries (subtract line 2 from line 1 above)     ________ 
 Enter the number from line 3 above on the Claim Form line 6) a) 
 
4. Multiply the number on line 3 above by 0.34 (34 cents per mile)             ________ 
 Enter the number from line 4 above on the Claim Form line 6) b)  
 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
 
A minimum strategy would be to assume that a fourth or less of the recorded miles were 
used for business (not personal) use, and a maximum strategy would be to assume that 
nearly all of the miles were used for business (not personal) use.  The worksheet above 
can be used to calculate the number claimed under each of these assumptions using the 
number for July from the Mileage Record on the next page: 
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MILEAGE RECORD 
 
DATE:                                      ODOMETER          MILEAGE 
 
January 31                                               3917                     
 
February 28                                             4135                 218 _  
 
March 31                                                 4346                 211_ 
 
April 30                                                   4421                 _75_ 
 
May 31                                                    4589                 168_ 
 
June 30                                                    5044                 455_ 
 
July 31                                                     5346                 302_ 
 
August 31                                                5678                 332_ 
 
September 30                                          ____                 ____        
 
October 31                                              ____                 ____ 
 
November 30                                          ____                 ____        
 
December 31                                           ____                 ____ 
 
 
 
 7) Parking & Tolls 
 Any money paid for parking or tolls required for the delivery of any 
product is allowed as a Franchise Credit on the Claim Form, such as for parking 
in a parking garage when making a delivery to an office address.   
The minimum strategy is to claim no Parking & Tolls amount since there is no receipt 
for it, and the maximum strategy is to assume that there must have been some Parking & 
Tolls amount to claim even without a receipt.   
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8) Insurance  
Insurance directly related the protection of the product from loss by theft or 
casualty is allowed as a Franchise Credit.  General insurance is not allowed, such as on 
your automobile, house, or life, unless it is additional insurance purchased to cover the 
additional business. 
The Insurance claim comes from the July invoice for insurance reproduced below with 
the minimum strategy assuming that the renters insurance covers all personal property 
in the house of which one tenth is work related materials.  The maximum strategy 
assumes that the renters insurance is only for the work related materials in the house.  
Because you have already claimed 34 cents per mile on your automobile, there is no 
separate claim for auto insurance.  
 
 
Comprehensive Insurance Company 
For all your insurance needs  
You’re covered with us. 
 
Statement Date: July 1st  
 
Renters Insurance:   $-0-          Expires August 1       
Auto Insurance:         12           Expires August 1 
Life Insurance           -0-           Expires August 1 
 
Due and Payable:     $12   
 
 
 
9) Materials & Supplies 
The Company supplies the materials although Franchise Credits are allowed if 
additional materials are purchased.  Supplies required for business use in your house 
because you have no other office are also a source of Franchise Credits.  Again, no 
personal purchases are allowed, but costs of materials used exclusively for making 
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product or exclusively for office work, such as filing the Claim Form, can be listed on 
line 9. 
    
10) Utilities  
Utilities expenses related to the making of product are sources of Franchise 
Credits.  The proportion of the total utilities that can be taken as credits are that 
percentage of your total home that you use making product times the portion of days that 
you work.  For example, if you make product in a kitchen that is one of four rooms in 
your home, and you work 10 days a month, then a $20 utility bill would be a Franchise 
Credit of 25% (one out of four rooms) times 33% (10 out of 30 days) times $20 or .25 x 
.33 x 20 = $2.06, so $2.06 would be entered on line 10 of the Claim Form.  The 
following worksheet may be used for calculating the amount of Utilities Credit to claim.     
  
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
Utilities Credit Worksheet 
 
1. Total Utilities for the month                    ________ 
 
2. Percentage of home used in making product  ________ 
 
3. Line 1 multiplied by Line 2      ________ 
  
4. Number of days of the month worked ________ 
 
5. Line 4 divided by 30 (days/month) ________ 
   
6. Line 3 multiplied by Line 5 (enter here and on Line 10 of the Claim Form) ________ 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
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The two Utilities figures on the Claim Form can be calculated from the worksheet on the 
previous page using numbers on the utilities bill reproduced on the next page.  The 
minimum strategy assumes that the work is mostly done in the kitchen (one of five rooms 
in the house) and that work is only being done about a fourth of the days of the month.  
The maximum strategy claims that a fourth of the house is used for the work and that 
work was done every day of the month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11) Total Franchise Credits  
 Add lines 4 – 10 and enter the total on line 11 of the Claim Form. 
12) Reimbursement Allowance 
 Multiply Total Credits on Line 11 by 15% (0.15) and enter on line 12 of the 
Claim Form. 
13) Total Pay-Off Amount 
Subtract the amount on Line 2 from the amount on Line 1 and add that result to 
the amount on Line 12.  The amount on Line 13 of the Claim Form is the combination of 
the numbers on Line 1, Line 2 and Line 12, remembering that the number on Line 2 is 
negative. 
This is the amount of your Earned Bonus that you are requesting to have returned 
to you.   
Utility Bill 
July, 2002 
 
 
Last Month’s Charge:                            $18.00 
Last Month’s Payment:                            18.00 
This Month’s Charge:                              16.00 
 
Total Due by July 23, 2002:                    $16.00 
 
Total Due after July 23, 2002:                 $21.00                                                  
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General Comments: 
For a minimum strategy, no correction could result even if there is scrutiny, so 
the pay-off will remain unchanged at about $7.00.  For a maximum strategy, IF there is 
no scrutiny, the pay-off could be as high as $30.00 or so.  IF there is scrutiny, it could 
result in reducing the maximum strategy to as low as a couple of dollars ($2.00).  
If you took the minimum approach, then your chances of being scrutinized are 
only 2% and that the results of that scrutiny are to not change the amount of the pay-off.  
If you took a maximum approach, then your chances of being scrutinized could go up to 
48%.  The higher the amount of your claim between the minimum and maximum, the 
higher the chances of being scrutinized between the 2% and 48% range.  The pay-off 
could be reduced depending on how high the amount of credits that you claim.   
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUMENT FOR RECORDING DATA 
Claim Form 
For Franchise I.D.# (line 6 of Payslip Voucher) _______ 
 
July 2002 
 
1) Bonus Earned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
2) Franchise Fees Due  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
3) Franchise Credits: 
 
4) Standard Promotion Allowance . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
5) Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
6) Automobile Mileage ______ x 34 cents per mile . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
7) Parking & Tolls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _________ 
 
8) Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
9) Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
10) Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _________ 
 
11) Total Franchise Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
12) Reimbursement (Credits x 15%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
13) Total Pay-Off Amount  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _________ 
 
  
76
APPENDIX F 
 
INFORMATION USED FOR EXPERIMENT 
 
AUGUST Claim Form   
Line-by-Line Instructions 
 
1) Bonus Earned  
On line 1 of the Claim Form, place the amount of Bonus you have earned for the 
month.  This amount is reported to you as Item 5 on your Pay Slip Voucher.  The bonus 
is based on how much you worked over the minimum expected work level. 
Your August Pay Slip Voucher is reproduced below: 
 
Pay Slip Voucher 
August 2002 
 
1)                                                  5)         
    Employee ID Code:                     Monthly Bonus Earned:   
           87068                                                   $25.00 
 
2)                                                   6)     
    Franchise Fee Due:                      Franchise ID Number:        
                 $23.00                                                1205 
 
3)                                                   7)            
    Unpaid Wages:                             Local Surcharges:  
                  -0-                                                       -0- 
 
4)                                                   8)           
     Previous Amount Due:                Late Payment Charges: 
                 -0-                                                        -0- 
 
 
 
2) Franchise Fees Due   
On line 2 of the Claim Form, place the amount of the Franchise Fees you have 
been charged for working under the national contract.  This amount has been based on 
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the amount of work you have done, calculated as a percentage of the minimum expected 
work level plus a percentage of work done over that minimum expected work level. 
 
 
3)  Franchise Credits 
No entry is required on this line; the following lines are amounts of money you 
have spent in doing your work.  You are entitled to a percentage reimbursement of those 
expenses. 
  
4) Standard Promotion Allowance  
Because you are operating this business in your home, it promotes the franchise 
in the area where you live.  There are different ways to claim a promotion credit, but the 
easiest is this Standard method.  Using the Standard method is safe because the 
Company will tell you if you qualify for a larger Promotion Allowance under a different 
method.  To use the Standard Promotion Allowance, simply find the size of your 
franchise territory (where you live) and whether you are in a rural or urban area on the 
Standard Promotion Allowance Table provided on the next page.  The dollar figure for 
your size & type of franchise territory should be entered on line 4 of the Claim Form. 
 
 
/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/ 
Standard “Promotion” Allowance Table 
 
Population:  <100,000  100,000 – 250,000  250,000 – 1,000,000 >1,000,000  
 
Urban: $1 $2 $3 $4 
Rural: $3 $4 $5 $6 
/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/ 
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5) Advertising  
In addition to the Standard Promotion Allowance, any money that you spent for 
the active promotion of the business is allowed as a separate credit.  Examples would 
include having business cards printed, sponsoring a sporting event that put the Company 
logo in their programs, or placing a business advertisement in a local newspaper.   
The only receipt related to Advertising expense in August is reproduced below: 
 
 
BRYAN EAGLE 
CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS 
 
Paid 8-17-02:                   $12 
TEXT: 
“Roommate wanted, private bath, share 
extra big kitchen, no slackers 555-2107” 
 
 
6) Automobile Mileage  
Credits are allowed for car mileage driven for the delivery of product.  This 
mileage must be for business purposes only and not for personal reasons.  For example, 
if in one day you make four deliveries that require 8 miles of driving and you also go to 
lunch at a restaurant that is 3 miles out of the way, then you have a total car mileage 
driven of 11 miles that day, but 3 miles are considered personal and only 8 miles can be 
used in calculating the Automobile Mileage Credit. 
You have been given a mileage log that allows you to record the odometer 
readings of your automobile each month and thereby determine the total mileage you 
have driven in each month.  You must also keep track of how many of those miles were 
driven for deliveries versus how many were driven for personal reasons. 
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Different people have different driving habits, so it is recommended that all 
deliveries be made with only one single automobile.   
The following worksheet on the next page can be used for calculating the amount 
of Automobile Mileage Credit to claim:  
 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
Automobile Mileage Credit Worksheet 
 
1. Total mileage driven in the month (from the Mileage Record provided)  ________ 
 
2. Total mileage driven for personal reasons (include personal errands)     (________) 
 
3. Total mileage driven for deliveries (subtract line 2 from line 1 above)     ________ 
 Enter the number from line 3 above on the Claim Form line 6) a) 
 
4. Multiply the number on line 3 above by 0.34 (34 cents per mile)             ________ 
 Enter the number from line 4 above on the Claim Form line 6) b)  
 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
 
A minimum strategy would be to assume that a fourth or less of the recorded miles were 
used for business (not personal) use, and a maximum strategy would be to assume that 
nearly all of the miles were used for business (not personal) use.  The worksheet above 
can be used to calculate the number claimed under each of these assumptions using the 
number for August from the Mileage Record on the next page: 
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MILEAGE RECORD 
 
DATE:                                      ODOMETER          MILEAGE 
 
January 31                                               3917                     
 
February 28                                             4135                 218 _  
 
March 31                                                 4346                 211_ 
 
April 30                                                   4421                 _75_ 
 
May 31                                                    4589                 168_ 
 
June 30                                                    5044                 455_ 
 
July 31                                                     5346                 302_ 
 
August 31                                                5678                 332_ 
 
September 30                                          ____                 ____        
 
October 31                                              ____                 ____ 
 
November 30                                          ____                 ____        
 
December 31                                           ____                 ____ 
 
 
 7) Parking & Tolls 
 Any money paid for parking or tolls required for the delivery of any 
product is allowed as a Franchise Credit on the Claim Form, such as for parking 
in a parking garage when making a delivery to an office address.   
The note on the following page is related to parking. 
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TAMU PTTS 
8-28-02 
Parking Ticket (reduced by appeals board) 
$5.00   
This has been paid with your tuition bill. 
Thank you!  
 
8) Insurance  
Insurance directly related the protection of the product from loss by theft or 
casualty is allowed as a Franchise Credit.  General insurance is not allowed, such as on 
your automobile, house, or life, unless it is additional insurance purchased to cover the 
additional business. 
The Insurance claim comes from the August invoice for insurance reproduced below 
with the minimum strategy assuming that the renters insurance covers all personal 
property in the house of which one tenth is work related materials.  The maximum 
strategy assumes that the renters insurance is only for the work related materials in the 
house.  Because you have already claimed 34 cents per mile on your automobile, there is 
no separate claim for auto insurance.  
 
 
Comprehensive Insurance Company 
For all your insurance needs  
You’re covered with us. 
 
Statement Date: August 1st  
 
Renters Insurance:   $10           Expires October 1       
Auto Insurance:         12           Expires September 1 
Life Insurance            15          Expires October 1 
 
Due and Payable:     $37   
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9) Materials & Supplies 
The Company supplies the materials although Franchise Credits are allowed if additional 
materials are purchased.  Supplies required for business use in your house 
because you have no other office are also a source of Franchise Credits.  Again, 
no personal purchases are allowed, but costs of materials used exclusively for 
making product or exclusively for office work, such as filing the Claim Form, 
can be listed on line 9. 
The following receipt is for materials and supplies purchased in August although 
not obviously related to business expenses: 
 
 
OFFICE DEPOT 
 
RECIEPT 
 
AUGUST 28, 2002 
 
Paper                             $5 
Pencils                             7 
Envelopes                        9 
Calculator                      12 
Back Pack                      16 
 
TOTAL:                       $49 
 
Cash Received:             $49 
 
We appreciate your business.  Please remember us for all your school supplies. 
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10) Utilities  
Utilities expenses related to the making of product are sources of Franchise 
Credits.  The proportion of the total utilities that can be taken as credits are that 
percentage of your total home that you use making product times the portion of days that 
you work.  For example, if you make product in a kitchen that is one of four rooms in 
your home, and you work 10 days a month, then a $20 utility bill would be a Franchise 
Credit of 25% (one out of four rooms) times 33% (10 out of 30 days) times $20 or .25 x 
.33 x 20 = $2.06, so $2.06 would be entered on line 10 of the Claim Form.  The 
following worksheet may be used for calculating the amount of Utilities Credit to claim.     
  
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
Utilities Credit Worksheet 
 
1. Total Utilities for the month                    ________ 
 
2. Percentage of home used in making product  ________ 
 
3. Line 1 multiplied by Line 2      ________ 
  
4. Number of days of the month worked ________ 
 
5. Line 4 divided by 30 (days/month) ________ 
   
6. Line 3 multiplied by Line 5 (enter here and on Line 10 of the Claim Form) ________ 
*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* 
The two Utilities figures on the Claim Form can be calculated from the worksheet on the 
previous page using numbers on the utilities bill reproduced on the next page.  The 
minimum strategy assumes that the work is mostly done in the kitchen (one of five rooms 
in the house) and that work is only being done about a fourth of the days of the month.  
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The maximum strategy claims that a fourth of the house is used for the work and that 
work was done every day of the month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11) Total Franchise Credits  
 Add lines 4 – 10 and enter the total on line 11 of the Claim Form. 
 
12) Reimbursement Allowance 
 Multiply Total Credits on Line 11 by 15% (0.15) and enter on line 12 of the 
Claim Form. 
 
Utility Bill 
August, 2002 
 
 
Last Month’s Charge:                            $16.00 
Last Month’s Payment:                            16.00 
This Month’s Charge:                              19.00 
 
Total Due by August 23, 2002:             $19.00 
 
Total Due after August 23, 2002:          $24.00                                                     
  
85
13) Total Pay-Off Amount 
Subtract the amount on Line 2 from the amount on Line 1 and add that result to 
the amount on Line 12.  The amount on Line 13 of the Claim Form is the combination of 
the numbers on Line 1, Line 2 and Line 12, remembering that the number on Line 2 is 
negative. 
This is the amount of your Earned Bonus that you are requesting to have returned 
to you.   
 
 
General Comments: 
 
If you take the minimum approach, then your chances of being scrutinized are 
only 2% and the results of that scrutiny cannot change the amount of the pay-off.  If you 
take a maximum approach, then your chances of being scrutinized could go up to 48%.  
The higher the amount of your claim between the minimum and maximum, the higher 
the chances of being scrutinized between the 2% and 48% range.  The pay-off could be 
reduced depending on how high the amount of credits that you claim.   
 
 When you have filled out your August claim form, print it and turn it in. 
 
You will be asked to complete some follow-up forms. 
 
 Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
SCRIPTED INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Experimenter Script 
1. 
You have three envelopes marked “Admin,” “July” and “August.”  
 Everyone open only the Admin envelope.  You will see a Consent Form that you must 
read, sign, and pass in.  When you are done with that, we will discuss the Franchisee 
Background sheet.   
2. 
I hope you will not mind if we read the Franchisee Background sheet together. 
3. 
Okay, in the envelope marked Admin, you will find a June Claim Form with columns of 
comparison numbers and everything related to where those numbers may have come 
from.  Go ahead and open just that envelope marked Admin.  Normally, there would be 
only one number per line, but two columns are used to provide a side-by-side 
comparison of a “low risk” strategy of claiming credits versus a “high risk” strategy of 
claiming credits.  So let us all go over that together, in order to be sure about what might 
be right or wrong on this Claim Form. 
4. 
Find the receipts that were stapled together after filling out June’s Claim Form.  You can 
see that you have a Payslip Voucher telling you the amount of Bonus Earned and the 
amount of Franchise Charge to put on the Claim Form. 
Also, you can see from the Standard Promotion Allowance Table on page 2 of the line-
by-line instructions that $2 is the correct amount for line 4 of the Claim Form.   
The Advertising expense claim is supported by the receipt from the Battalion.   
The numbers on line 6 of the Claim Form are both based on the mileage recorded for 
June in the Mileage Record.  A low risk strategy would be to assume than a fourth or 
less of the recorded miles were used for business (not personal) use, and a high-risk 
strategy would be to assume that nearly all of the miles were used for business (not 
  
87
personal) use.  The worksheet on page 3 of the line-by-line instructions can be used to 
calculate the number claimed under each of these assumptions. 
The low-risk strategy is to claim no Parking & Tolls amount since there is no receipt for 
it, and the high-risk strategy is to assume that there must have been some Parking & 
Tolls amount to claim even without a receipt.   
The Insurance claim comes from the June invoice for insurance with the low-risk 
strategy assuming that the renters insurance covers all personal property in the house of 
which one tenth is work related materials.  The high-risk strategy assumes that the 
renters insurance is only for the work related materials in the house.  Because you have 
already claimed 34 cents per mile on your automobile, there is no separate claim for auto 
insurance.  
The two Utilities figures on the Claim Form can be calculated from the worksheet on 4 
of the line-by-line instructions using numbers on the utilities bill.  The low-risk strategy 
assumes that the work is mostly done in the kitchen (one of five rooms in the house) and 
that work is only being done about a fourth of the days of the month.  The high-risk 
strategy claims that a fourth of the house is used for the work and that work was done 
every day of the month. 
The math seems to add up and the all the calculations seem correct to get pay-offs on 
line 13 of $12.95 for the low-risk strategy, and $26.63 for the high-risk strategy.  Those 
would be the pay-offs as long as there was no scrutiny of the Claim Form. 
If there were scrutiny of the Claim Form (30% chance for the low-risk strategy and 
higher for the high-risk strategy), then the resulting effect of that scrutiny is shown on 
line 14.  For the low-risk strategy, no correction would result even if there was scrutiny, 
so the pay-off would remain unchanged at $12.95.  For the high-risk strategy, IF there 
was scrutiny, the overstatement of Automobile Mileage, the claiming of Parking & Tolls 
with no documentation to support the expenses, the allocation of Insurance costs, and the 
assumed numbers for Utilities calculation would all result in a total reduction of $19.28 
times the 15% reimbursement rate.  As a penalty, half again that much ($19.28 * 0.5 = 
$9.64) would also be deducted from the pay-off leaving the $2.72 shown on line 15.      
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Are there any questions about these two strategies compared on June’s Claim Form? 
5. 
You can keep any information from June available, but be careful not to confuse the 
receipt amounts with those from other months. 
Let us all go forward with doing July’s Claim Form based on what we have just learned 
looking at the June Claim Form comparisons. 
6. 
The July receipts are loose in the envelope, so be sure to get them all out and keep the 
stapled June receipts separate from them.   
I will be walking around to answer any questions as you complete the July Claim Form. 
Be sure to put your Franchise Number from the Pay Slip Voucher on the second line 
from the top of the Claim Form. 
When everyone is done, we can discuss the results you came up with. 
7. 
Alright, everyone is a little different, but you probably should have a Total Pay-Off 
Amount calculated for July of between $7.00 & $40.00. 
8. 
Did anyone have anything outside that range? 
Okay then, remember that if you took the low-risk approach that your chances of being 
scrutinized are 30% and that if you took a higher-risk approach that your chances of 
being scrutinized would be higher.  The pay-off could be reduced depending on how 
extreme the risk you took in claiming credits.  As an extreme example, a pay-off of $20 
could get reduced to a single dollar if scrutiny revealed an attempt to defraud the 
Company on the July Claim Form.  A claim for $7 could not be reduced on the July 
Claim Form even if scrutinized. 
9. 
I want you to keep whatever materials out that you want to help you with the August 
Claim Form, and use the envelopes to keep things out of the way.  Please be careful not 
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to confuse the receipts from different months as many look similar although from 
different months. 
10.  
 Everyone should work individually and when you are done filling out the August Claim 
Form, bring it the cashier for payment. 
11. 
If there are no further questions, you may go ahead and open the August envelopes and 
begin.  
You should find everything you need in that last envelope. 
It is up to you to choose the amount of risk you will use in filling out the Claim Form for 
August. 
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APPENDIX H 
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
 
 
Age: ________________ 
 
Classification:    Freshman         Sophomore          Junior        Senior                Other 
(explain) 
 
Cumulative Grade Point Average:    ______________ 
 
How many computer classes have you had: _______________ 
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VITA 
Born to a loving family, I experienced a happy childhood until I went to school 
and it was pretty much downhill from there. 
Currently, I have a homestead exemption (which is a wonderful thing in Texas 
with a rich legal history and a tidy property tax savings) at my permanent address of: 
Steven J. Olshewsky, 412D First Street; College Station, TX  77840-7608. 
My educational background produced for me the following degrees: Bachelor of 
Science in accounting (with a minor in economics) from the University of Kentucky in 
1985, Master of Business Administration (with a concentration in taxation) from the 
University of Kentucky in 1993, Juris Doctor from the University of Kentucky in 1993, 
and, of course, Doctor of Philosophy in accounting from Texas A&M University in 2003 
(all without a high-school degree or G.E.D., not bad for a drop-out). 
My professional licensures include: Certified Public Accountant & Attorney-at-
Law, both in Kentucky. 
I have taught accounting and law at such schools as: University of Kentucky, 
Eastern Kentucky University, Sullivan College, Georgetown College, Transylvania 
University, Blinn College, The University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University, 
University of Houston and Prairie View A&M University, as well as private review 
courses including Kaplan, Lambers & Becker, the latter two I initiated in Kentucky. 
My publications have appeared in Tax Notes and Oil, Gas & Energy Quarterly. 
I have presented papers at numerous refereed conferences both national and 
regional.   
I continue to lobby for the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act (HR 2037 in 
the current 108th Congress) whereby citizens who conscientiously object to war (as 
defined by the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 450 et seq.) can fully pay 
100% of their taxes with the official recognition that their money is to be used only for 
any non-military government spending.  This legislation is the first step toward allowing 
a true democracy in which men and women of conscience can begin to work against the 
horrors of war.  Today, there are 32 members of Congress co-sponsoring the bill. 
